Wednesday, January 30, 2008

Upper Kotmale: Who is right?



By Hemantha Withanage and Charmini Kodithuwakku

Originally appeared in Dailymirror in 2002


It's indeed a shame that Sri Lanka's most acclaimed natural waterfalls in the hill country will cease to exist soon, all in the name of development. The chronology of events on Upper Kotmale Hydropower project would raise so many questions rather than provide answers. The most important question of all, is whether justice was served to protect the greater interest of the public and the future generation in our country? If the approval process was carefully studied, then it would be an insight to the vicious cycle of approving a project even if it may contain disastrous consequences to the environment and society. Sri Lankan energy policy contains disastrous consequences to the environment and society. The policy caters to promote hydropower, as the CEB vehemently believes that it is the cheapest source to generate energy.

What is Upper Kotmale?

In 1994 the Ceylon Electricity Board proposed the UKHP to generate a 150 MW to ultimately contribute 530 GWH of energy to the national grid annually. The project was located at the Kotmale Oya on the western slopes of the Nuwara Eliya hills. It extends over an altitude of 700-1200 m on upstream of Kotmale Oya. The project intends to harness the water of seven tributaries Devon Oya, St. Andrews Stream, Kuda Oya, Dunsiance Oya, Pundal Oya, Ramboda Oya and Kotmale Oya by diverting water above several water falls. The project is expected to commence in 2002 with a 34 feet dam across the Kotmale Oya at Talawakelle, which will divert water through a 12.8 km long head race tunnel to an under ground power house with two units of 7 Mw turbines located 1Km upstream of the confluence of Puna Oya and Kotmale Oya.

At the same time water of six tributaries is expected to be diverted to be utilized for generation by connecting with Talawakelle regulations pond through diversion tunnels and head race tunnels and this project is funded by the Japanese Bureau on Economic Cooperation (JBIC).

Wrong decision?

The EIA was opened for public comments in 1995. The Ministry of Irrigation, Power and Highways was designated as the Project-Approving Agency (PAA) and was prepared to approve the project despite recommendation of its own technical evaluations committee.

The technical evaluation committee refused to give the green light but recommended that three other alternatives Nos. IV, VI and VII should be re-examined in detail. However, the Secretary Ministry of Irrigation, Power Energy decided to approve the project on the recommendation of the oversight committee and requested the concurrence of the Central Environmental Authority (CEA). The CEA refused permission for the project on the basis that the project had not evaluated the location alternatives.

The PPA could not grant approval without the concurrence of the CEA which refused permission.

When the approval was refused for the first time in 1995, the CEB exercised its statutory right of appeal to the Secretary of the Ministry of Environment and Women's Affairs. The Secretary refused the appeal on the grounds that the Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIAR) submitted by the CEB failed to give an adequate consideration to alternatives, especially an alternative known as the "Yoxford Option" which had been proposed by the Central Engineering Consultancy Bureau for the second time. However, he gave liberty to the CEB to submit a fresh application with an EIAR that addressed the alternative proposal. The PPA had to refuse its approval for the project and the CEB then exercised its right, given under Sector 23DD of the National Environmental Act, to appeal to the Secretary to the Ministry for Environment.

Then the CEB submitted an addendum to its EIAR dealing with "Yoxford Option" which would have been less destructive to the waterfalls in 1996. This option was rejected on the basis that it contained several adverse geological features making it unfeasible for the dam and reservoir as required by the project. In law there is no provision for an "addendum" to a rejected EIAR. The CEA which had designated itself as the new approving agency considered this as a fresh EIAR and went through the prescribed procedure by publishing a notice in the news papers. Consequently, in 1997, the CEA refused approval on the addendum and then the CEB again appealed to the Secretary, Ministry of Forestry and Environment on January 15, 1997.

In spite of several representations by the concerned citizens at the public hearing during the EIA stage, the secretary considered that the parties to the dispute were the CEB and the CEA, and accordingly summoned these officials only for the appeal hearing. The public was prevented from further participation in the process.

The secretary in his judgment declared that considering the mission of the Environment Ministry, the power need of the country, the economic benefits claimed for the project are more important than the question of the waterfalls. He was critical of environmental lobbying and hinted that the EIA procedure delays the economic development in the country. However, the economic benefits were highlighted by only considering the demand in the power sector in the country.

There was no independent studies done on the economic valuation of the project and even the EIA fails to address these aspects fully.

The most damaging consequence associated with UKHP are the adverse impacts on several of Sri Lanka's waterfalls and the geological instability of the whole project site. For example, in Devon Oya diversion tunnel air photography has revealed that there are open cracks and other deteriorated rock zones at lineament valleys crossing the tunnel route. The scientific communities have raised many questions on the geological unsuitability of this project but yet it was unheeded and was granted approval.

Presently the injustice of this project is further exemplified by the fact that hydropower is heavily dependent on the weather, and the implementation of such a project would be an economic burden to the country with the upcoming water taxation policies. Betting to cater to the power demand of the country through hydropower would certainly be a mistake when considering the unpredictable weather patterns. This US$260 million project would be awarded as a soft loan. The tourist board and the public in the project area and the non- governmental organizations in the country have raised serious objections on the implementation as it contains grave environmental implications.

This hydropower project approval procedure failed to assess the importance of a sacred natural resource like a waterfall that is blessed with unique characteristics that cannot be mitigated nor compensated. Unlike other waterfalls, Devon, St. Clare, and Ramboda are easily motorable and are quite popular among the residents and the tourists alike.

EFL completely opposed the Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project from the very inception as we felt that it would not be a viable project in terms of social and environmental impacts.

We actively participated in the approval process of this project as well as in more recent power projects. You must be aware that the project was rejected three times by state agencies whilst finally, on a dubious appeal, it was allowed.

As a result of a court action filed by EFL, a hearing was afforded to us, and based on the Order made on Appeal by the Secretary to the Ministry of Forestry and Environment on March 27, 2000, a monitoring committee was appointed to evaluate the implementation of the mitigatory measures and the watershed management plan. Our organization too is represented in this Monitoring Committee, which comes under CEA.

Impacts : could they be mitigated?

At successive meetings of this Committee, its members have expressed serious concerns about many aspects of the project including the watershed management plan and the absence of mitigatory measures considering the fact that it is situated in a land-slide prone area. We also feel that the geological surveys done in respect of the project are totally inadequate.

In addition, the natural beauty of seven prime waterfalls would be affected by this project. The technical problems such as construction of the 21-kilometer long tunnels to bring water from other streams being under earth slide prone areas and the switch yard being under a major earth slip called Niyamgamdora from which people were relocated during the Mahaweli project, have not been adequately addressed.

We are sad to see this project being formulated at such great cost to our country's aesthetic beauty and environmental resources, without considering the advice of eminent engineers and scientists who have always advocated an alternative, to merely generate 150MW of electricity.

150 MW or less?

Due to the low rainfall in the area and the present dry weather patterns, and this being a run-of-the-river (ROR) type of project as against a major reservoir, there is no guarantee even of 150 MW power capacity and according to some experts it will guarantee less than half of that i.e. 70 MW.

So far the CEB has spent 1000 million rupees for the Feasibility and EIA and another 30 million for a very short document which is the addendum. The total cost estimated is US$ 260 million.

More than anything else, we feel that the financial burden of this project is not justified by the amount of electricity it can generate, without even considering the other costs mentioned above.

Save Japanese waterfalls, but what about ours?

Destruction of waterfalls is an Environmental crime. Japan saves its waterfalls as sacred water falls. But it's a shame that they provide money to Sri Lanka for destroying such beautiful waterfalls in Sri Lanka. The next year being declared 'the year of Eco tourism', we wonder how they can justify this eco destruction.

CEB and CECB: who betrays Yoxford?

It was the Central Engineering Consultancy Bureau who suggested the Yoxford option as a suitable alternative to the UKHP project. This was thoroughly discussed during the decision making process and also at the Presidential Secretariat just after the rejection of the UKHP by the Secretary to the Ministry of Environment in 1996. This is the reason for asking the CEB to do the addendum.

But there was no justice to the Yoxford and the CEB submitted a negative report, which is called the addendum after doing an incomplete analysis.

When the second appeal was being heard, the Chairman of the CECB was removed and a new chairman was appointed. Neither the Former Chairman nor the Engineer who proposed the Yoxford was allowed to participate in the hearing but the new chairman who knew nothing on Yoxford was head and he said for unknown reasons that CECB does not anymore promote that option.

(Hemantha Withanage is Executive Director of Friends of the Earth, Sri Lanka while Charmini Kodithuwakku is an Environmental Scientist)